Canada and the European Union (EU) share, to a certain extent, a similar political culture, one based on multilateralism and the use of soft power. Nevertheless, over the past fifteen years Canada has been sometimes adopting disarmament policies that are similar to those of the EU and different from those of the US, while in other times it has been adopting policies that are similar to those of the US and different from those of the EU. This indicates that similarity in political culture alone is not sufficient enough to create convergence on foreign policies and that certain conditions must first be met for political culture to take precedence over neorealist explanations when dealing with security issues. Using Canadian, EU and US decisions on the issues of anti-personnel landmines and Iranian nuclear proliferation dilemma as case studies, this article analyses the conditions under which political culture plays a role in forming similar security policies.
Introduction
During the past decade there has been a growing dissatisfaction with using only neorealist approach in explaining foreign policies, and a growing interest in using also cultural arguments to explain international relations and security policies. "In the post-Cold War world," argues Huntington, "for the first time in history, global politics has become multipolar and multicivilizational." 1 Accordingly, in the post-Cold War era "the most important distinctions among people are not ideological, political or economic. They are cultural…People define themselves in terms of ancestry, religion, language, history, values and customs." 2 Culture as a foreign policy indicator appeared promising in explaining some phenomena that neorealism alone can not explain. However, there are a number of interrelated cultural explanations which explore themes such as military, strategic, organizational, global and political culture from a different perspective than neorealism. This paper focuses on political culture variable (which will be defined in the next section) since, as John Duffield puts it, "Political culture promises to explain phenomena that are puzzling from the perspective of leading non-cultural theories, such as neorealism.
Yet it is likely to apply to a broader range of cases than do the alternative cultural concepts that have been employed."
3 Also "political culture subsumes most alternative societal-level cultural constructs, such as strategic culture and military culture, while remaining focused on political phenomena in contrast to national character."
4
This work treats the European Union (EU) as a whole, instead of providing analysis on particular European Union members. In doing so, (and for the sake of theoretical parsimony), the assumption that there is a common political culture at the EU level, at least with regards to the policies at hand, is maintained. This assumption stems from apparent increases in EU reliance on the role of the 1 Samuel Huntington. Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) role in forming policy priorities for the two disarmament issues this work is based on: landmines and nuclear non-proliferation. In fact, not automatically but through intergovernmental cooperation and negotiations, the EU has reached a common response to those international issues at hand. Almost all EU members have adopted a similar position in the landmine case (Finland serves as an exception). And all EU members adopted a common position or a joint action in the case of Iran's nuclear policy. Additionally, there appears to be an emergence of talks about a unified EU political culture (at least among the older Western European member states, when these issues were peaking) which did not exist a decade ago.
5
Notwithstanding the rising strength of political culture as a variable, helping to explain states behaviour in the post-Cold War period, the political cultural argument has also been criticized for its inability to explain some forms of state behavior, such as those that states adopt despite their obvious contradiction with their prevailing political culture. Thus, a deeper analysis may help reveal that in order for the political cultural variable to be a highly determining measure in explaining state behaviors, especially in international security domains, certain conditions need first to be met.
Therefore, the question that this paper asks is: under which condition(s) does political culture play a leading role in shaping foreign and security policies of states or international bodies (such as the EU)?
Through inductive reasoning and interpretive case analysis, it appears that all three conditions need first to be simultaneously satisfied for political culture to count as the leading explanatory factor for states implementing certain security policies. First, the security issue which the state is dealing with needs to be perceived of as a low threat or risk issue. Thus, it must be perceived of (objectively or subjectively) as a threat solely to human and not a threat (whether directly or indirectly) to national security. Second, the public needs to be aware of the issue and be involved in the decision making process. Public opinion can be either manifested through strongly expressed views in the street or organized through Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and civil society movements. Third, the political elite or policy makers, be it a group or an individual, which is involved in the decision making process must be an idealist, legacy seeker, charismatic actor or a firm believer in the issue as well as the political culture that is being represented. In other words the policy maker or political entrepreneur must represent and act on behalf of the political culture of the collective; and he must be able to influence public opinion on the matter. The author, hence, chooses to analyze these particular case studies (landmines and Iran's nuclear programme) and the corresponding policies that were adopted for them in Canada, the EU and the US to help illustrate the argument put forward. The case studies prove to correspond to the circumstances set up by the author. In fact, the two cases line up on all three aforementioned conditions but in a contradictory fashion. While in the landmines case all three conditions were present, in the case of Iran's nuclear programme they are all absent. This allows the author to demonstrate the necessity of all three conditions to be present in order for political culture to play a determinant role in foreign policy.
In order to illustrate the importance of these three conditions which allow political culture to Iran's nuclear Programme may be attributed to the fact that the three conditions, that were mentioned earlier, were all satisfied during the land mine situation but were not all met during the Iranian case.
The fact that Canada and the EU acted similarly when it came to policies on banning landmines than on prohibiting Iran's nuclear ambitions-in spite of the political culture similarities between Canada and the EU and despite the political culture differences between Canada and the US-demonstrates that political culture on its own is not sufficient to explain foreign policies and that it needs to be looked at within a framework of the surrounding circumstances. There are three identifiable ways in which political culture can directly influence behavior of a collective; as such, political culture may help define the political goals of the group. Firstly, it can define the way a state or an institution perceives its interests and, in turn, the way they pursue policies that will insure these interests. Secondly, political culture can shape the group's perception of the external environment. As a result, the group pays particular attention to certain events and actions that challenge their political culture, while neglecting other which do not directly affect their identity.
Finally, political culture may eliminate (or emphasizes) on certain actions. Therefore, some behaviors or policies become an impossible solution while others become viable options depending on the limits that political culture draws for the group.
14 Applying political culture as an independent variable to account for security and foreign policies has been criticized for various reasons. One of these criticisms considers the study of the effect of political culture on states behavior as "ethnocentric," one that is not based on empirical evidence but on feeling or intuition. However, "these early criticisms were addressed through an increased use of more systemic techniques such as sample survey, quantitative content analysis, and structured interviews." Another common criticism is that cultural explanations are methods that scholars resort to whenever they are short of other explanations which are based on more concrete factors. This criticism does not flow from the inherit limitations of cultural variables but from the way they are deployed.
Thus, scholars should not wait for other explanations to be exhausted before they resort to culture. On the contrary, they should consider it from the start, and define immediately the unit and the cultural form that they are going to use-be it institutional, global, military or political-and remove behavior 13 from their definition of culture to avoid tautology. Finally, the most frequent and serious criticism "concerns the difficulty of defining, operationalizing, and measuring cultural variables." Political culture has been criticized by many scholars-such as Desch-for lacking a clear definition; however, one could object to this claim since Risse and Duffield seem to give a relatively clear definition of political culture. Although, it is not obvious what Risse believes to be a "long periods of time"; this author, for the purpose of this paper, will consider values that are stable for at least a decade to constitute a political culture. Also, Desch's criticism may apply to many other concepts, such as power which is used by neorealist and lacks a clear definition as well. Add to that, Desch who himself criticizes cultural approach concedes that "the definitional problem, however, is largely one of application rather than principle, because it is possible to clearly define and operationalize culture."
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The article now proceeds to compare the political culture and two disarmament policies concerning
APMs and Iran proliferation of nuclear weapons in Canada, the EU and the US. In order to try and understand the factors that shaped decisions among these political communities, this author analyzes the conditions under which the policies were taken. By doing so, it will become evident whether political culture plays the role this author predicts it does, when all three conditions are present.
Anti-Personnel Land Mines (APMs) Treaty
The Ottawa Convention or Mine Ban Treaty is a formal "convention on the prohibition of the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of APMs and on their destruction. December 1995. 27 According to an interview conducted with an expert on the issue, the number of landmines could be higher than reported; no one knows precisely how many mines were buried but went unrecorded.
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Realizing the urgency and gravity of the situation, Canada and the EU with the help of various
NGOs mobilized quickly to deal with this dreadful human security condition. 29 They pursued policies, which were in accordance with their political culture and their aspiration to promote human security globally through multilateral cooperation, despite the huge economic cost that they knew they would incur for this mission. Actually, at the time the United Nations (UN) estimated that the cost of removing all the active landmines will accumulate to US $33 billion and will take many years to accomplish. 30 Canada and the EU still joined in this international campaign that would not only prohibit them from the use, transfer and production of APMs, but that would also require them to destroy their stockpile of it and provide humanitarian assistance and rehabilitation programs to landmines victims. 31 Canada's Prime Minister in 1998-Jean Chrétien-in order to help "universalize the land mines convention and allow it to achieve its humanitarian objectives," allocated CAN $100 million for this cause over a period of five years, which was renewed for CAN $72 million for another five years (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) 35 In fact, the US wanted to take part in the treaty, especially when it sensed that it was being left out of the initiative, 36 but the international community could not convince it to bend on the North Korea exception. Consequently, Canada and the EU signed a comprehensive treaty, while US national security and realist considerations took precedence over humanitarian security. In the end, the US acted according to its political culture, which is generally self regarding, and did not sign the treaty.
37

Analysis of the Landmine case in light of political culture conditions
The Canadian, EU and US responses to the landmine issue demonstrates how political culture can play a significant role and shaped these entities' foreign policies. Clearly, Canadian and EU's general preference for multilateralism and their concern about human security distinguishes them from the US and makes them sign humanitarian agreements, like the Ottawa Convention, when the US does not. However, political culture on its own does not account for the EU and the Canadian response. So, now in order to prove this point the article will go on to discuss in detail the three conditions which made political culture matter.
The first condition stresses that the security issue affecting the state needs to be perceived of as a low threat one. Clearly, APMs are considered a low risk issue for Canada and the EU because it poses a threat to human security but not to a national one. And yet, it is important enough from a humanitarian perspective. there is a huge number of NGOs that got involved and pushed the US, Canada and EU member states to sign the ban-land mines treaty. 49 However, NGOs did not succeed in the US because landmines for the US are a national security matter since it involves North Korea, and generally the US follows its interests more than international norms. However, even without the US's support the treaty was signed after a year of negotiations only, which makes it one of the fastest treaties to be signed and ratified due to NGOs and public intense involvement.
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The third condition focuses on the role of the leader in setting the agenda and pushing for the policy. The political entrepreneur who took the leading role on the APMs treaty was definitely the Israel wiped off the map." 64 So, although Iran now is stressing its commitment to the NPT, the fear is that once it develops nuclear weapons it will act like North Korea and abandon the treaty and sell its knowledge to rogue states and terrorist organization. 65 These intentions were presented in Khamenei's statement that Iran is "prepared to transfer the experience, knowledge and technology of its nuclear scientists." 66 Hence, the West views the verbal assurances by Iranian officials and supreme religious leaders as time buying mechanisms that will change once Iran acquires nuclear defence capabilities.
Second, Iran's lack of transparency, its failure to report to the IAEA the construction of nuclear facilities and its pursuit of nuclear technology covertly for 18 years have fuelled suspicion in the West that Iran's nuclear programme has a "military dimension" to it. 67 Indeed, in February 2006, ElBaradei reported that the Agency has not seen clear indications of deviation of nuclear material to nuclear weapons; however, he also noted that there was a lack of cooperation and transparency from the Iranian side over the past three years of dealings with the IAEA, 68 which created, according to may Western analysts, a "confidence deficit" regarding Iran's intentions. 69 Third, many governments, including the US, the EU and Canada, do not understand Iran's insistence on acquiring the 'know how' of nuclear technology, and enriching Uranium on its soil if it was only for civilian use. Actually, one of the alternatives or "carrots" that was proposed by the E3/EU and refused by Iran in 2004 was for the EU to provide all necessary civilian nuclear energy to Iran, as long as the latter agreed to suspend all its nuclear activities. 70 In addition, the West claims that Iran does not need nuclear power due to the fact that it has the third largest oil reserve in the world, and that nuclear power is more expensive for the Iranians to generate than oil-fired power. 71 However, Iran's Oil Ministry Deputy for International Affairs, Hadi Nejad-Hosseinian, argues otherwise, insisting that at the current rate of oil production (which is 1.5 billion barrel a year), Iran's reserve (of 133.3 billion barrels) will deplete within 90 years, 72 and Iran does not want to be dependent on others for its domestic energy in the future. The possibility of Iran developing a nuclear weapons, or even knowing how to, causes a great concern in the West since it poses a "threat to the stability in the Middle East," which is strategically very important for the West to maintain. 76 So, Canada, the EU and the US appear to view these ambitions as an imminent threat to their national security and deem it a fatal situation. For that reason they all agree that they cannot allow Iran to continue with its Uranium enrichment program. 77 However, when it comes to Iran, despite the fact that the West shares the same views/goals its entities do not seem to agree on the means to achieve these ends. The US has been pressuring the UN Security
Council and the EU to enforce stronger sanctions against Iran while the EU keeps pushing for diplomacy, negotiations and mitigated sanctions.
78
When Iran's nuclear activity was discovered in 2002, Canada appeared to err on the side of caution by not stating openly its unconditional support for the US regarding Iran's nuclear problem. In fact, at first it was hard to infer clearly from officials' statements whether Canada was on the EU's side and conservative parties, indicates that partisan politics is not what is affecting Canada's response.
Instead, Canada's behavior is affected by the non-satisfaction of the three conditions which are needed for political culture to play a role in foreign policy. One only has to read the official statement of 
Analysis of the Iran issue in light of political culture conditions
By using the Iranian nuclear proliferation issue as a case study, the author tries to demonstrate how Canadian material interests were given precedence over Canada's political culture regarding this problem. Canada, the EU and the US in this case all have similar fears and goal, which is to stop Iran's Uranium enrichment program, nevertheless they use different means to achieve this goal. In dealing with Iran the EU follows to a certain degree its norms and political culture, and hence it prefers the use of diplomacy and persuasion. The US follows its interests and political culture, and so it favors sanctions and use of force (or threatening language). While Canada in this case does not follow its political culture but considers its strategic interests and thus it bandwagons with the US, abandoning its soft power tradition in the adopting of the US's hard power rhetoric. behavior, is that the three conditions-which are essential to be all satisfied in order for political culture to play the main role in shaping foreign policies-are absent in the Iranian situation. In order to demonstrate this point, the article will go on to discuss those three conditions and their effects in detail.
The first condition stresses that the security issue which the state is dealing with needs to be perceived of as a low threat one. This is obviously not the situation here since the Iranian problem poses a threat to national security and to the survival of the state (although not in the direct sense).
Iran's nuclear ambitions are of great concern to the West; not only because Iran's purposes for insisting on enriching Uranium on their soil is ambiguous to the West, but also because Iran's previous policies and statements have had aggressive tendencies and tones towards the West. Canada, the EU and the US seem to be uncertain that the Iranian government would act responsibly and refrain from the use of nuclear weapons in order to advance some of their Islamic fundamentalist goals. The second condition emphasizes that public opinion has to be involved in the decision making process. On the Iranian nuclear proliferation topic, public pressure-whether organized through open demonstrations or through NGOs-is absent in Canada the EU and the US. The subject has been discussed for more than three years solely through high level officials. Civil society appears to agree with their respective governments on the problem and the solutions. However, the absence of civic participation might also be due to the lack of government's transparency on the topic-which usually tends to alienate citizens and creates apathetic feeling towards the issue-or it may be due to the fact that the horrific effects of using nuclear weapons are not as tangible on a daily basis, as the consequences of using other conventional weapons.
The third condition focuses on the role of the leader in acting on behalf of his collective identity and pushing for the policies that would advance his countries political culture. For the EU, Solana seems to be the main political figure dealing with Iran's nuclear file and he has been trying hard to calm down the rising conflict between the US and Iran. to lack charisma, experience or popularity. For instance, looking at the national poles suggests that the public mistrusts these leaders' actions or motives, at one point or another during their term in office.
Unlike Axworthy who possessed all three qualities before getting involved in the landmine issue, these leaders are either young and new to Foreign Affairs at the time when they had to deal with the Iranian issue (like Mackay). Or they lack charisma and popularity, as can be observed from the results of the Angus Reid Global Monitor Poll, in 2007, on Harper. Apparently, "fewer Canadians are satisfied with their prime minister…and 28 per cent say their opinion of the head of government worsened over the past months." 85 However, as stated earlier, trust in a leader and his popularity are necessary leadership qualities, without which it becomes hard for a leader to consolidate his countries political culture into concrete policies that he can convince his people, his government and other governments to adopt.
Conclusion
Despite the attractiveness and popularity of neorealism as an explanation of state decisions in international politics, in the post-Cold War period it faces some severe challenges in providing an adequate accounting for many aspects of state security considerations. At times, states seem to be adopting policies that are not in their best interests (from a neorealist account) but more in accordance with their political culture, while at other time the opposite is true. Therefore, one must think that certain circumstances must be ripe for one approach to be more employable than the other, in order to account for this policy alteration. This article addressed the conditions under which the political culture approach can be used as an alternative to neorealism in order to explain security policies in the West.
The article commenced by demonstrating the similarities between Canadian and EU political cultures, while revealing important differences between Canada and the EU on one hand and the US on the other. For instance, Canada and the EU prefer multilateralism and the use of soft power, and the US prefers unilateralism and the use of hard power. This work then utilised two case studies which dealt with disarmament policies -anti-personnel land mines and Iranian nuclear proliferation -to illustrate that despite political culture similarities between Canada and the EU, they have adopted different paths when they tackled each issue. This again proves that political culture alone is not sufficient for two entities to have similar security policies, and that certain conditions need to be first satisfied in order for political culture to matter in forming foreign policies.
The article argues that three conditions need to be satisfied simultaneously for political culture to count as an explanatory factor for states implementing certain security policies. First, the security issue which the state is dealing with needs to be perceived of as a low security threat. Second, the public needs to be aware and involved in the matter. Third, the political elite who is involved in the policy making process must be an idealist and a firm believer in the political culture that he represents.
Finally, by using the two case studies the article manages to demonstrate how these conditions were present in the landmines case and absent in the Iranian one. The analysis of the case studies suggests that when the three aforementioned conditions are all present, political culture can be used as a viable supplementary to neorealism. Thus, both political culture and neorealism are, independently, unable to provide a wholly convincing account of state decisions over the paths and priorities in foreign affairs. A new balance must be struck which incorporates these theories (among others) to produce a more realistic account of international politics today.
